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for debate, it should first be inquired, what is the general practice
and usage of the country. This will generally be found of a con
trolling character.
(3.) If neither of the foregoing rules afford any clear indication
in regard to the matter, resort must be had to the time and purpose of the erection, and the expectation or understanding of the
parties interested in opposite directions at the time of the erection
of the structure, or the attachment of the article to the freehold.
There will commonly arise out of this inquiry some clear guide to
the solving of all doubt. But it should always be borne in mind,
that this latter mode of solving the question is only to be resorted to
where both the former ones fail to afford any satisfactory solution.
For the practice which has obtained in some of the American
states, of allowing houses and barns and mills to be treated as
mere personalty, although built in the ordinary mode, upon the
ground of some oral contract, expectation, or understanding
among the parties interested therein, cannot fail to prove in the
end of evil consequence and tendency, and cannot be too decidedly repudiated by all lovers of good order and sound law: Leland
v. Gassett, 2 Wash. Dig. Vt. Rep. 335, 836; s. c. 17 Vt. Rep.
(on another trial) 403 ; Prestonv. Briggs, 16 Id. 124 ; fan Ness
v. Pacard,2 Peters's S. C. Rep. 137.1
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DECISIONS.

Superior Court of Cincinnati.
DUMONT v. WILLIAMSON.
The meaning and purpose of an indorsement without recourse, examined and
adjudged.
When a note is sold in market, the vendor and vendee being upon equal terms,
having each the same knowledge of the parties to the instrument, and there is no
-oncealmcnt or misrepresentation by the vendor, who indorses it "without rocourse," he is not liable to the vendee, if the name of one of the parties is forged.
I But such an article as a pump, as before intimated, if erected by the owner of
the land, will go with the land by deed, or mortgage, or descent, or devise. But
if placed there by a tenant it is removable: llcCracken v. Hall, 7 Ind. 30. So in
regard to other doubtful cases, the contract of the parties is of great weight : Brear.
ley v. Cox, 4 Zab. 287.
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He. is not liable on any supposed contract growing out of his indorsement, as it
is but a tranafer of the note, without the usual guaranty: nor can he be held at all
unless fraud, concealment, or misrepresentation is proved, or the note is given in
payment of a prior indebtedness.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
STORER, J.-This case is reserved from special term for the
opinion of all the judges upon the legal questions arising on
demurrer.
The plaintiff's petition states, " that on the 12th day of May
1860, at Cincinnati, Henry Essman made his promissory note to
William Wolf, or order, for $500, value received, five months
after date, which note purported to be indorsed by said Wolf, and
afterwards came to the hands of the defendant Williamson, who
afterwards indorsed and delivered the same to the plaintiff, but
without recourse on htim." A copy of the note is made a part
of the petition, with the indorsement thus restricted and qualified.
It is further alleged, "1that the defendant by such indorsement
thereby warranted the signature of said William Wolf was genuine
and made by him, when, in truth and in fact, it was not, but the
same was and is a forgery;" by reason whereof the note was of
no value, the said Essman, the maker, being wholly insolvent.
There is also the usual averment of demand and notice, and a
claim to recover the amount of the note.
The demurrer admitting all the facts properly pleaded and their
legal implications, the question is directly presented for our decision, what was the legal effect of defendant's indorsement " without recourse."
We find no English cases where the point has been adjudicated,
though qualified indorsements are often made in Great Britain
upon bills and notes. Mr. Chitty says, in his work on Bills,
p. 235, this mode of indorsing is allowed in France and America,
and states the object to be "to transfer the interest in the bill to
the indorsee, to enable him to sue thereon, without rendering the
indorser personally liable for its payment." In ch. 6, p. 224, 225,
he has placed in his text the forms of indorsement applicable to
various cases, and in class four, where he describes a qualified
indorsement, he illustrates his meaning by using the words "James
Atkins, sans recours," or " James Atkins with intent only to
transfer my interest and not to be subject to any liability, in case
of non-acceptance or non-payment."
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Judge SToRY adopts this definition with the additional remark,
that a qualified indorsement without recourse, though it saves the
indorser from liability, does not restrain its negotiability: Prom.
Notes, § 146; Bichardson v. Lincoln, 5 Metcalf 201.
An absolute transfer by indorsement imposes upon the party
making it, in contemplation of law, 1. That the instrument is
genuine, as well as all the attendant signatures; 2. That the
indorser has a good title to the instrument; 3. That he is competent to bind himself as indorser; 4. That the maker is able to pay
the note, and will do so upon due presentment at maturity; 5. If
not paid when thus presented, that upon notice to the indorser he
will discharge it: Story on Prom. Notes, § 135.
It must follow, then, that when an indorsement is made and
taken without recourse in the qualified form, as it appears upon
the note in controversy, every liability, that would .otherwise
exist, is excluded, and no action can be maintained upon the
defendant's transfer thus restricted.
For every practical purpose, such a restricted indorsement may
be placed upon the same footing as a note payable to bearer, or
transferred by delivery. In the latter case, the person making
the transfer does not thereby become a party, nor does he incur
the obligation or responsibility belonging to an indorser.
This doctrine was settled by Lord HOLT, in Gov. and Co. Bankc
of England v. NYewman, 1 Lord Raym. 442, and is adopted by
all the late text writers.
It has been attempted, however, to create a liability, not in
virtue of any contract contained in the indorsement or delivery
of the instrument, but upon a legal implication that there is in
every such case a warranty that the instrument is genuine, and
should it prove a forgery, he who has transferred it must refund
to the proper party the money he may have received.
This assumption places notes and bills on the same footing with
merchandise or any other commodity that may have been the
subject of sale, and requires him who may have received an
equivalent for an instrument subsequently proved to be worthless,
to place the party to whom it has been delivered in "1statu quo."
Now it is not to every case, even between vendor and vendee,
that the rule, thus ascertained, can apply; for an article of merchandise, sold without warranty, where the buyer and seller have
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equal opportunity to inspect it, and both are equally ignorant of
inherent defects, there can be no complaint if a defect is afterwards discovered. It is only when there is concealment, misrepresentation, or fraud, that the seller becomes responsible to the
buyer.
We are not surprised at the apparent confusion which exists in
the statement of the question by some modern writers upon commercial law; and in the adjudications even of courts who have
followed their dicta without careful examination. The difficulty
in part, is found in the fact that many of these treatises, when
first published, were unpretending volumes, briefly, yet clearly,
stating legal principles and referring, to decisions equally brief:
but edition after edition has been multiplied until the points once
settled have become obscured by redundant language, announcing
a former doctrine merely in a new form, and the courts have too
often been content with quoting cases without tracing the principle
to its origin.
They would seem to have forgotten the maxim: " Melius est
peterefontes, quam sectari ri uulos."
And thus it is we find in the discussion-of the point we are
about to determine, such a variety of views ; positive assertions
afterwards qualified on the same page, while they impress upon
the reader no definite idea of what the law is; or the statement is
so broadly made, thlat it partakes rather of assumption than
matured opinion.
We feel at liberty, therefore, to ewercise our own judgment, and
we think the conclusion to which we have arrived is fully sustained upon legal principles.
There is no averment in the plaintiff's petition of the manner in
which he became the owner of the note, nor yet that he paid
value, or gave anything as an equivalent. We may fairly presume, then, he purchased it in the ordinary way in market, no
represeftation being made by the defendant other than the implication that legally follows his qualified indorsement. There isno
fact before us which imputes unfair dealing or fraud to the
indorser; his liability is claimed simply upon the ground that his
assignment was a virtual warranty of the genuineness of the note.
It is then the ordinary case of the owner of a bill sending it
into the market for sale, or offering it himself to a purchaser,
acting meanwhile in good faith, not concealing any knowledge he
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may have, proper for the buyer to know, giving no verbal opinion
even that the instrument is valid.
A similar case in principle is found in Fenn v. Hfarrison, 3
T. R. 759, where Lord KENYON said: "It is extremely clear that
if the holder of a bill of exchange send it to market, without
indorsing his name upon it, neither morality nor the laws of this
country will compel him to refund the money for which he has
sold it, if he did not know at the time that it was not a good bill.
If he knew the bill to be bad, it would be like sending out a
counter in circulation to impose upon the world instead of the current coin."
So it was held in Parker v. Kennedy1, 2 Bay S. C. 392,
"that a bare assignment implies no warranty, but only an agreement to permit the assignee to receive the debt to his own use."
So in Cummings v. -Lynn, 1 Dallas 449, and in Bobertson v.
Vogle, Id. 255, where Judge SHIPPEN decided, that an indorsement at common law amounts only to an assignment of all the property in the bill or note without making the assignor responsible.
A, sale of the note, therefore, as of any other commodity,
imposes no liability upon the vendor, simply by the act of sale.
It is a purchase by the buyer without warranty, and the rule of
"caveat emptor" will apply.
If, however, a note is given with a restricted indorsement, in
payment of a precedent debt, the better opinion is, if the instrument is afterwards ascertained to be forged, the party receiving it
shall not be the loser; he is still to be remunerated for the sum
originally due. The thing received having proved to be valueless,
the original claim revives.
Not so where the note is disposed of by sale. "While it may
be claimed," says Judge STORY, Prom. Notes, § 118, "that he
who transfers a note by delivery, warrants in like manner that the
instrument is genuine and not forged or fictitious, unless where it
is sold as other goods and effects by delivery merely, without
indorsement, in which case it has been decided that the law in
respect to the sale of goods is applicable, and there is no implied
warranty."
So in Chitty on Bills 246, "When a transfer by mere delivery
is made only by way of sale of the bill or note, as sometimes
occurs, or in exchange for other bills, or by way of discount, and
not as a security for money lent, or when the assignee expressly
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agrees to take it in payment, and run all risks; he has, in general,
no right of action against the assignor, if the bill turns out to be
of no value."
This view of the question relieves it of all real difficulty, and
places the liability of the indorser or assignor upon a satisfactory
ground. And we thus find the law determined in the very
thoroughly considered case of Baxter v. D1urand, 29 Maine 434,
where Judge SHEPLEY, giving the opinion of the whole court, held
that "1 One who sells a promissory note, by delivery, upon which
the names of indorsers have been forged, is not liable upon an
implied promise to refund the money received therefor, if he sold
the same as property and not in payment of a precedent debt, and
did not know of the forgery," The learned Chief Justice carefully examined the conflicting cases, and distinguishes very clearly
the real question in controversy. He admits the authority of
Jones v. Byde, 5 Taunt, 488 ; Fuller v. Smilh, 1 Car. and Payne
197; Cfammidge v. Allenby, 6 13. & C. 373; Collyer v. Bri.
ham, 1 Metc. 547 but very properly confines them to the case
of payment for a previously subsisting debt,
This case is quoted with approbation by Judge STORY, Prom.
Notes, .§ 188, and is relied on as the leading authority by Judge
ECCLESTON, in the late case of Bienan v. Fisher, 12 Maryland
497, where the same point is directly decided, following out tot
only the ruling of Judge SmpLEY, but adopting the greater part
of his argument. It is also referred td by Professor Parsons, in
his late work on Bills and Notes, vol. 2, 589, 590, to support the
same doctrine, which is stated in the text of his work very fully
and without any reservation.
In a former part of the same volume, page 38, in a note, it is
said, the distinction taken in the ease in ZMaine does not seem to
have been well founded; but whether the author is responsible for
this note or not we cannot say; we should rather believe his
unqualified approval of the same case, after he had composed
nearly six hundred pages in adition to what he then had written,
expresses -his true opinion, more especially as he again reiterates
the doctrine in the same volume, page 601. The case of Wheeler
v. Fowle, 2 Hardy 149, decided by our late Brother SP.NcER,
does not conflict with the rule we find so well established; it was
determined upon its .peculiar circumstances,- the whole evidetee
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being heard, from which a representation, other than the sale and
delivery of the note, might have been inferred.
We are all of opinion that the pleadings in this case present no
cause of action against the defendant, upon his indorsement.
There is no fraud alleged in the transfer; no prior debt existing,
for which the note was taken ; no representation made beyond the
fact of indorsement, without which we hold there could be no
recovery by the plaintiff.
The demurrer will be sustained, and the cause remanded.
The importance of the question involved in the foregoing case, and the
want of entire uniformity in the decisions in regard to it, seem to justify
the space which we have devoted to the
very able and carefully-reasoned opinion
of the learned judge, and we should not
feel called to add anything more, if we
did not consider that the tendency in
regard to the subject which the case
encourages was in the wrong direction.
The -weight of authority still is, unquestionably, in favor of the early doctrine of the books, that one who passes
a note or bill by mere delivery assumes
an implied obligation, in all cases, unless there is something to show h different purpose, that the same is genuine
and what it purports to be upon its face,
and that he has the legal right to transfer the title to the instrument. This is
nothing more than the vendor of goods,
without express warranty, assumes, by
implication of law.
It is distinctly affirmed in the case of
Gurney v. Womersley, 28 Eng. L. & Eq.
256, s. C. 4 Ell. & Bl. 132,'that the
vendor of a bill of exchange, though no
party to the bill, is responsible for its
genuineness; and, if it turns out that the
name of one of the parties is forged, and
the bill becomes valueless, he is liable to
the vendee, as upon a failure of consideration. In this case the name of the
acceptor upon whose credit the bill was
discounted by the plaintiffs proved to

have been forged by the drawer, the
defendant having procured the discount,
but declined to give any guarantee in
regard to the bill, but had no knowledge
of the defect in the bill.
The same, or a similar, question is discussed in Gompertz v. Bartlett, 24 Eng.
L. & Eq. 156, where the bill purported
to be a foreign bill, and was unstamped.
It proved to have been made in London,
and was therefore void, for want of a
stamp. The Court of Queen's Bench'
held, that the vendor of a bill of exchange impliedly warrants that it is of the
kind and description that it purports to
be on its face, and that the vendee might
recover back the price of the bill, as
upon a failure of consideration.
These decisions were made as late as
1854, and have never been questioned in
England, as far as we know. There is
no question, we think, that they are in
strict analogy with other portions of the
law of contracts applicable to sales of
personal property and of choses in
action, and that they will be maintained
in England. There should therefore, as
it seems to us, be some very persuasive
reason to justify a departure from them
and establishing a different rule in this
country. The main current of American authority seems to be strong in the
same direction.
It is so declared by the most approved
text-writers. Mir. Justice STORY, Promissory Notes, § 118, says: "In th6
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next place he (the vendor of a note,
without express guaranty) warrants in
the like maner, that the instrument is
genuine, and not forged or fictitious,"
citing Bayley on Bills, cli. 5, § 3, p. 179,
5th ed, ; Chitty on Bills, 269-271 ; Id.
ch. 6, p. 244, 9th ed; Id. p. 364, 366;
and many decisions, English and American. The law is stated in the same
terms in Parsons on Notes and Bills,
vol. 2, p. 37.
The learned judge in the principal
cae sens to infer that, because the case
of Baxter v. Duren, 29 Me. Rep. 434,
is referred to by these text-writers, that
lie may fairly count upon the *eight of
their testimony in favot of the soundness
of that case. But Mr. Justice STOnT
deceased many years before the date of
that decision and Professor Parsons
does not attempt to settle thei law upon
the point, but contents himself, as maost
text-writetr do, by giving the present
state of the authority, whieh is sufficiently
illustrated by the learned judge in the
principal case. Profcsso" Parsons did as
we should have done; lie gave all the decisionls, and theu gave his adherence to
the preponderating side.
The question is examined in Cabot
Bank v. .Morton, 4 try
156, by a
learned jurist, to the weight of Whose
authority Awehave all been long accustoned to ref'et with unhesitating confidence. This distinguished judge states
the rule much in the same terms before
quoted from Mr. Justice STORY. "It
seems to fall under a general rule of
law, that, in every sale of personal property, the vendor impliedly warrants
that the article is in fact what it is described and purports to be, and that the
venidor has a good title or right to
transfer it."
The rule is stated by an eminent jurist
in Connecticut, Mr Justice ELLSWORTir,
in Terry v. Bissel.. 26 Conn. Rep. 23,
much in the same terms, quoting the
Von. XIV.-22
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very language of Chief Justice SISAw,
as stated above.
In Thrallv; Newell, 19 Vermont Rep.
202, the rule is laid down in much the
same terms by Judge HALL.
And in Aldrich v. Jackson, 5 R. I.
Rep. 218, Chief Justice Aums says:
"The vendor of a bill or note, by the
very act of sale, impliedly warrants th
genuineness of the signatures of the
previous parties to it."
And in New York, since the early
case of ,3arklev. Ha(field, 2 Johns. 455,
it seems to have been regarded as settled, that a payment in forged paper is
no payment, upon the ground of an implied warranty of genuineness. But in
the late case of Ketchum v. Bank of Commerce, 19 N. Y. Court of Appeals 499.
it was held, by a divided court, that, if
the forged paper was sold, there was no
implied warranty of genuineness. This
seems to be substantially the distinction
upon which all the exceptional cases
have attempted to stand. It is found, or
the germ of it, in the early ease of Ellis
v. Wild, 6 Mass. Rep. 321, Where merchandise was sold and a promissory note,
which proved to be a forgery, taken for
it. PARsoxsi C. J., held, in delivering
the opinion of the full court, that if the
note were, by the intention of the parties, sold and payment accepted in
"ram," the defendant was not responsible as for an implied warranty of the
genuineness of the notes. "But if the
plaintiff intended to sell the rum for
money, and the defendant intended to
buy rum, and the payment by the notes
was not a part of the original stipulation,
but an accommodation to the defendant;
then he has not paid for the rum, and the
action is maintainable."
Now we think it fair to say, that when
one exchanges rum for promissory
notes of a third party, or what purports
to be such, and gives no express warranty, the implied warranty is the saee
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on the part of the one party as of the
other. And if the rum proves to be
something else, as a preparation of a
deadly character, of no value for any
purpose, or if it proves not to have been
the property of the vendor, but of another who reclaims it, or if the note
proves to be a forgery, or stolen under
such circumstances that no title is conveyed by the vendor, either party will
be liable to make good the loss to the
other, upon the implied warranty of the
thing being what it purports to be, and
that the vendor had good right to sell as
he did. And it is idle to attempt to
escape from the question fairly presented,
by asking a jury to conjecture whether
it was a sale of the note, and accepting
payment in rum, "for the accommodation of the purchaser," or a sale of rum,
and accepting payment in the note, for
like accommodation.
And it seems to
us, that if such a distinction had been
first
stated, by some judge or writer, less
known to fame than the distinguished
Chief Justice of Mfassachussets, whose
word went for law in his time, it would
scarcely have been taken up and aeted
upon by so many eminent courts as this
already has been. It is, in fact, however much it may have been indorsed,
nothing more than a refinement, too nice
for common apprehension.
But it is proper to say that this whole
doctrine of the existence of any such
distinction being maintainable is entirely
repudiated in a very recent case in Massachusetts, Merriamv. Wolcott, 3 Allen

258. And we cannot, more to our own
mind, express the want of foundation for
any such distinction, than by quoting
the language of the very able and learned
judge, fr. Justice CHAPmAx, who gave
the opinion of the court in th6 case last
cited: "There are two cases which state
a distinction -in regard to this implied
warranty that is not recognised in the
other cases," citing Ellis v. Wild, supra,
and Baxter v. Duren, supra, to which
may now be added .Fsherv. Lieman, 13
Mld. Rep. 497, and the principal case.
Mr. Justice CHAPMAaN continues: " If
this is the law of this Commonwealth,
then the plaintiff cannot recover * *;
but it is difficult to see any valid reason
for such a distinction.
Whether the
purchaser pays cash or discharges a debt
in payment for the forged paper, the
injury is the same to him. There is in
both cases a failure of consideration,
growing out of a mistake of facts. The
actual contract and the implied understanding as to the genuineness of the
note is in both cases the same. And we
think that the authorities, which hold
the seller to an implied warranty, in such
case, that the note is genuine, are in
conformity with the principles of sound
reason and justice, and with the understanding of the parties in making such a
contract;" citing the earlier cases of
Cabot Bank v. Morton, supra, and Lobdell v. Baker, 1 Met. 193, as having already virtually overruled Ellis v. Wild.
I. F. I.
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Supreme Court of Michigan.
THE PEOPLE v. VALENTINE CORNWELL.
Although rape can only be accomplished by force, and with the utmost reluctance
and resistance on the part of the woman, yet no more resistance can be required in
any case than her condition will enable her to make; and if she be insensible, or
unconscious of the nature of the act, or for any reason not a willing participator
the slight degree of physical force necessary to accomplish carnal knowledge is
sufficient to constitute the offence.
If the woman's consent is obtained by fraud, the nature of the act is the same
as if consent had been extorted by threats or resistance overcome by force.
But where the carnal intercourse is not against the woman's desire, and no circumnstance of force or fraud accompanies the act, the crime of rape is not committed,
notwithstanding the woman was at the time not mentally competent to exercise an
intelligent will.

Ox exceptions from the Kalamazoo Circuit Court.
N. A. Bailch, for defendant.
A. Williams, Attorney-General, for The People.
CooLEY, J.-The defendant was informed against in the Circuit
Court for the county of Kalamazoo for rape, alleged to have been
committed upon one Mrs. Crittenden. The information was in all
respects in the usual form.
On the trial evidence was given that four persons walking in
the road through or past a piece of woods, saw Mrs. Crittenden
and the defendant in the woods together a few rods off; Mrs.
Crittenden at the time lying upon her back with her person
exposed, and the -defendant on his knees before her; that he did
not have hold of her, or seem to be exercising any control, nor
she to be making any resistance; that sexual intercourse took
place between them, after which, on some slight noise being made
by the witnesses, the defendant got up and ran off, while Mrs.
Crittenden came out towards the witnesses smiling, and followed
them to a house in the neighborhood where they were going to
visit.
The prosecution then offered evidence to show that Mrs. Crittenden at the time was insane. The defendant objected to this
as irrelevant, and also because, if insanity was a material fact, it
should have been alleged in the information. The court overruled
the objection, and the defendant excepted.
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The evidence given to establish insanity showed that Mrs. Crit
tenden was forty-eight or forty-nine years of age, in apparent good
health, of good size and strength; that she had been in the asylum
for the insane at Kalamazoo the preceding year, but -was at this
time residing at home with her husband ; that she worked some at
home, but appeared to be uneasy, and said she ought to be doing
something, but did not know what to do. The most pointed testimony was that of E. H. Van Duzen, the physician who was in
charge of the.asylum. while Mrs. Crittenden was there, who testified that she was in a state of dementia; not idiotic, but approaching towards it; that she had vague apprehensions of injury, and
a predisposition to be with men; a morbid rather than an active
desire to have sexual intercourse ; that that was one -wayin which
her insanity manifested itself; that she was dismissed from the
asylum not much improved, but under better control, and with
mor~e method in her conduct; and that her general health was
pretty good. The witness did not think she had an intelligen.
understanding at the time the crime was charged to have been
committed.
The court below, at the conclusion of the evidence, charged the
jury, that if the woman was so suffering from mental disease at
the time as to have no intelligent will to oppose to the act of the
prisoner, and he knew of this her condition, then her failure to
oppose him, or her seeming acquiescence, could not be urged
against a conviction ; and that if he made the attempt upon her
person, with the intent to have carnal intercourse, and she did not
resist because she had no intelligent will to oppose, he was guilty
of the offence charged. Under these instructions the jury returned a verdict of guilty.
The exceptions present to us questions which we do not find
distinctly passed upon in any adjudged case. The main question,
and the only one we deem it necessary to discuss, is, Whether the
carnal knowledge of a woman non compos mentis, under the cir
eumstances disclosed in the testimony above stated, can be punished
as rape under the statutes of this state ?
Rape is defined to be "the carnal knowledge of a woman by
force and against her will :" 1 East P. 0. 434; 4 Bl. Com. 210.
The statute providing for its punishment in this state-§ 5730 of
Compiled Laws-is in the following words: "If any person shall
ravish and carnally know any female of the age of ten years or
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more, by force and against her will, or shall unlawfully and carnally know and abuse any female child under the age of ten years,
he shall be punished," &c. This statute does not change the
nature of the offence as it existed at the common law, nor does it
describe two distinct offences; but carnal knowledge of the female
child under the age of ten years is held to be rape, on the ground
that, from immaturity and want of understanding, the child must •
be deemed incapable of assenting, and the act presumed to be the
result of force: People v. Mec-Donald, 9 Mich. 150; Commonwealth v. Sugland, 4 Gray 9. And it is insisted in this case
that an insane woman, or one not mentally competent to exercise
an intelligent will, is in the same position; as respects this crime,
as a child under ten years of age ; and that carnal knowledge of
her person would constitute the offence notwithstanding her acquiescence.
If the case before us can be held to be rape, it is evident it must
fall within the first clause of the section quoted, since the other is
confined by its express terms to carnal knowledge of female
children under the age of ten years, and cannot be extended by
analogy to embrace other cases. But to warrant a conviction
under the first clause of the section, the carnal knowledge must
have been by force and against the will of the woman; and as
there were facts before the jury in this case-from which they might
fairly infer that the woman, and not the man, was the soliciting
party, and the charge of the judge must be construed in the light
of the testimony, the real question to be determined is, whether
that is by force and against the will, where the woman assented to
and desired its commission, but without possessing at the time the
mental capacity which would render her responsible for her own
conduct.
The general rule requires not only that there should be force,
but that the utmost reluctance and resistance on the part of the
woman should appear: People v. Milorrison, 1 Park. 0. R. 625;
Woodin v. People, Ibid. 464. The essence of the crime is said
to be, not the fact of intercourse, but the injury and outrage to
the modesty and feelings of the woman, by means of the carnal
knowledge effected by force: Pennsylvania v. Sullivan, Addis.
143; 2 Bish. Cr. L., § 944; 3 Greenl. Ev., § 210. As these
circumstances are wanting in the present case, it becomes no-
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cessary to determine whether any other circumstances can be
regarded in the law as equivalents.
There are undoubtedly some cases where the law not only does
not require actual force to be proved, but where force is presumed
and not suffered to be disproved. The case of carnal intercourse
with a female child under ten years of age has already been
alluded to; but the rule in that case is not an arbitrary one. but
is based upon a well-understood fact in nature, that the child at
that tender age is wanting in sexual desire, and the presumption
that it is against her will is therefore in accordance with the
general fact. Nature indeed does not definitely fix the period at
which the child might become capable of understanding the cliaracter of the act, and of assenting to it; and by statute the age
of ten years has therefore been named as the period when the
conclusive presumption of opposing will shall'cease. The rule in
this case, we apprehend, depends less upon mental capacity than
upon physical considerations; and the age named is not the age
of consent, either at the common law or by the statute. It was
indeed at one time supposed that if the female was over ten years
of age, but under twelve, intercourse with her must necessarily be
rape, because the capacity to consent was wanting ; but the courts
did not so hold; and statutes were passed making the act a misdemeanor where the female was between the age of ten and the
age of consent, but where, not being against her will, it did not
fall within the definition of rape: 1 Hale P. C. 631; 4 Bl. Com.
212; 1 Russ. Cr. 693.
In the case of Regina v. Camrlin, 1 Den. 0. 0. 89, S. c. 1 0.
& K. 746, it appeared that the prisoner gave the woman liquor
for the purpose of exciting her, but which had the effect to make
her quite drunk; and while she was in a state of insensibility, he
took ad vantage of it and violated her. The court held the act to
be rape. The prosecutrix showed by her words and conduct, up
to the latest moment at which she had sense or power to express
her will, that it was against her will that intercourse should take
place. It was no answer to the charge, therefore, that she had
no opposing will at the moment when intercourse actually took
place ; since the prisoner had actually mastered it by means of
the stupefying drug; which was the same, as was well remarked
by one of the judges; as if it had been overcome by a blow.
In Rex v. Chater, 13 Shaw's J. P. 746, cited in 1 Bish. Cr. L.
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§ 343,note, and 2 Arch. Co. P1. and Pr. 167-806, the prisoner had
carnal knowledge of the person of a woman laboring under delirium, and who was insensible to the act. This intercourse was
held to be rape; but the decision can hardly be regarded as establishing an exception to the general doctrine as to this crime. If
the woman was insensible, some degree of physical force must
actually have been employed by the prisoner; and no more resistance is required by the law in any case than the condition of the
woman will permit her to make.
The facts in the case last cited made it open to the objection
which appears to have been taken in The State v. Crow, 10 West.
Law J. 501, note to Whart. & St. Med. Jur. § 463, where the
defendant was charged with the crime of rape committed upon an
insane woman. That case is sometimes referred to as holding that
all carnal intercourse with an insane woman is rape; but the point
involved was a very different one, and the decision sanctions no
such doctrine. It is not a little remarkable that while it is
insisted by the prosecution in this case that all intercourse with a
woman in this condition must be rape, because she has no capacity to consent, it was there urged by the defence that no intercourse with her, even by force, could be rape, because she had
no will to oppose. Rape, it was said, must be against the will;
and how can an act be against the will of a person who has no
will? This argument made it necessary for the court to determine what is meant by the word will, as used by the law in this
connection; and we quote from the decision so much as has a
bearing upon this question. " Is it true," said the court, "1that
an idiot or insane person has no will? What is the meaning of
these two words ? Do they imply a loss of will, or a mere unsoundness of mind? These words are thus defined by Webster:
Idiot-a natural fool; a fool from birth; a human being in form,
but destitute of reason, or the ordinary intellectual powers of
.man.' 'Insane-unsound in mind or intellect; mad; deranged
in mind;' and one of the words used to define insanely is fool.
isl /y. Fool is, defined to be ' one who is destitute of reason, or
the common powers of understanding; an idiot.' In Chitty's
Mled. Juris. an idiot is defined to be 'a person who has been
defective in intellectual powers, from the instant of his birth, or
at least before the mind had received the impression of any idea.'
Again: Chitty says that 'idiocy consists in a defect or sterility
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of the intellectual powers, while lunacy or madness consists in a
perversion of the intellect.' All these definitions imply either a
weakness or a perversion of the mind or its powers ; not their
destruction. Hence an idiot cannot be said to have no will, but
a will weakened or impaired;a will acting, but not in conformity
to those rules and motives and views which control the action
of persons of sound mind. Indeed, in an insane person the will
is too often fearfully active, and entirely uncontrollable by reason
or persuasion. There is here no lack of will, but simply a perversion of it. Nor is this the most conclusive answer to the argument. If there is no will, how are voluntary actions continued ?
Actions like respiration are instinctive, and independent of the
will; but eating, and numerous other acts, which necessarily imply the exercise of the will, are performed by idiots and insane
persons; and their exercise demonstrates the existence -of a will;
of a will that can assent to or dissent from what are clearly voluntary acts. I have therefore no hesitation in holding that both
idiots and insane persons are possessed of a will, so that it may
be legally and metaphysically said that a carnal knowledge may
be had of their personsforcibly and against their will."
From the brief note of the Scotch case of 3clcYamara, Arkley
521, 524, in 2 Bish. Cr. L., § 939, note, a similar defence would
seem to have been made there. The woman in that case was an
idiot; and the court told the jury that if they believed the defendant had actually penetrated her, and that she had shown any
physical resistance, to however small an extent, the offence would
be complete, in consequence of her inability to give a mental consent."
Both these cases, while not perhaps distinct authorities to that
effect, clearly imply that the same circumstances must exist to
constitute rape in the case of an idiotic or insane woman as where
the woman is of sound mind. The word will, as employed in
defining the crime of rape, is not construed as implying the faculty
of mind by which an intelligent choice is made between objects;
but rather as synonymous with inclination or desire; and in that
sense it is used with propriety in reference to persons of unsound
mind.
We are aware of no adjudged case which will justify us in construing the words "' against her will" as equivalent in meaning
with " without her intelligent assent ;" nor do we think that sound
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reason will sanction it. But though the definition of the offence
implies the existence of a will in the woman which has opposed
the carnal knowledge, no violence is done to the law by holding
in any case where the woman, from %bsence of mental action, does
not willingly acquiesce, that the physic,-! force necessary to effectuate the purpose, however slight is against her will. As was said
by ATDERSON., B., in Camplin's Case, above cited, a woman may
be supposed to have a general will not to be ravished; and the
man is not to be excused because she was prevented, or was
unable to exercise it in the particular case. If, therefore, a man,
knowing a woman to be insane, should take adi'antage of that fact,
to have knowledge of her person where her mental powers were
so impaired that she was unconscious of the nature of the act, or
was ulot a willing participator, we should have no difficulty in
holding the act to be rape, notwithstanding distinct proof of opposition might be wanting. All such cases stand upon reasons which
clearly distinguish them from the case now before us, where the
will was active, though perverted, and all idea of force, or want
of willingness, is distinctly disproved.
There are cases in which it has been held that if the woman's
consent is obtained by fraud, she at the time supposing the man
to be her husband, the crime of rape is not committed: Rex v.
Jackson, Russ. & R. 487 ; Regina v. Saunders, 8 C. & P. 265 ;
Regina v. Williams, Id. 286 ; Regina v. Clarke, 29 Eng. L. & E.
542; State v. Murphy, 6 Ala. 765 ; WTyatt v. State, 2 Swan.
894. But there are some cases in this country to the contrary ;
and they seem to us to stand upon much the better reasons, and
to be more in accordance with the general rules of criminal law:
People v. .etealf, 1 Wheel. C. C. 878, and note 881 ; State v.
SMepard, 7 Conn. 57. And in England where a medical practitioner had knowledge of the person of a weak-minded patient,
on pretence of medical treatment, the offence was held to be rape:
Regina v. Stanton, 1 C. & K. 415; s. c. 1 Den. C. C. The
outrage upon the woman, and the injury to society, is just as
great in these cases as if actual force had been employed; and
we have been unable to satisfy ourselves that the act can be said
to be any less against the will of the woman when her consent is
obtained by fraud than when it is extorted by threats or force.
Undoubtedly fraud would be much more readily inferred in a
case of mental derangement than where the woman's powers of
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mind were unimpaired; but in the present case no circumstance of
either fraud or force was required by the charge of the court to the
completion of the offence ; nor is it suggested that any such circumstance existed. The naked fact of intercourse, with knowledge of the
mental condition, was held sufficient. As one who has knowledge
of the facts which prove insanity must be supposed to know that
insanity exists, it would follow that in any case of doubt a man's
guilt or innocence would depend upon the final judgment of a jury
upon the preponderance of testimony on the question of the
woman's mental capacity. As marriage with an insane person
is void, it might become a serious question whether the ceremony
could protect the too partial bridegroom from prosecution for
rape, where he had relied upon manifestations which to 'him
appeared the evidences of genius, but which experts should convince a jury were only the vagaries of a disordered imagination.
The conclusion at which we have arrived is, that rape, at the
common law or under our statute, is not committed upon the
person.of a woman over ten years of age, where no circumstance
of either force or fraud accompanies the carnal knowledge. The
Circuit Court must be advised that in the opinion of this court
the conviction was erroneous, and that the verdict should be set
aside and a new trial granted.

Supreme Court of New York.
Second -District, General Term, February 1866-SRUHAM,
LOT, and BAnNARD, J's.
NODINE v. DOHERTY.
Injury received by horses and carriage through negligence may be recovered,
though let by plaintiff to defendant for use declared unlawful by the Sunday Act.
The hire of horses and carriages let on Sunday to be used to ride to a place known
as a place of resort for pleasure, cannot be recovered, being let for a purpose made
unlawful by statute.
PLAINTIFF let a pair of horses and carriage to defendant on
Sunday, defendant saying at the time of hiring that he wanted to
take his wife and family to Coney Island; this was all that was
said at the time of hiring. The defendant left the horses standing in
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the street unhitched, though cautioned not to do so; they ran
away, breaking the carriage, &c.
Action was commenced in Justice's Court, plaintiff nonsuited.
On appeal to County Court, Kings county, the judgment of the
justice of the peace was affirmed by DIKEMAN, J.
Appeal from county judge's decision.
J. G. Shumaker, for plaintiff, appellant.-1. As to the injury
done. If any person having in charge property of another allows
the same to be injured by reason of his negligence, he isequally
liable if his want of care was on Sunday as on any other day;
and any person who hires of another a horse and carriage on
Sunday, is not to be held harmless by the courts if he, by his own
fault, allows the carriage to be injured or destroyed. The penalty
of doing business on Sunday, which is unlawful, is that which is
imposed by statute; the fact of a person doing unlawful business
does not permit another to commit a wrong upon him with impunity.
As the doctrine maintained by defendant is unsound in
principle, neither is it warranted by precedent. In the case
of Woodman v. Hubbard, 5 Foster 67, in the Superior Court
of New Hampshire, the doctrine set forth in the Massachusetts
case cited and relied on by defendant is considered and rejected
as inequitable and unsound in an elaborate opinion by PERLEY, J.,
who, after considering the arguments and authorities, says: "It
necessarily follows from this view of the case that a man is wholly
without remedy for any injury that may be done to the horse he
lets on Sunday in violation of the law, if the necessity of showing
his illegal contract will preclude his recovery. Though the property is conceded to remain in the plaintiff, he has no remedy to
enforce his right, because he cannot show it without showing the
illegal contract of letting. And in all the numerous cases where
horses are illegally let on Sunday, the hirer might with perfect
impunity retain or sell them. This appears to be pushing the
application of a well-settled principle to an unnecessary and extravagant length, not required or warranted by the general
current of the authorities."
The same question having arisen in Norton v. Gloster, 46 Me.
520, in the Supreme Court of Maine, the court, citing the previous
case of Bryant v. Biddeford, 39 Me. 193, unanimously sustained
the case of Woodman v. Hubbard, above quoted.
In Adams v. Gay, 19 Vt. 358, in the Supreme Court of
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Vermont, the court held the defendant liable for his fraud
in deceiving plaintiff as to the value of a horse exchanged
by him, though the transaction was on a Sunday and unlawful
under the statute, and said, per REDFIELD, J.: " If the general
rulea of holding contracts made upon Sunday void, is also to shield
the contracting parties from the consequences of their frauds, and
to allow the dishonest and abandoned to retain whatever they may
be able to get possession of under such contracts, and at the same
time release them from all liability upon their own contracts, then
the rule itself will be productive of infinite mischief and should be
discarded altogether at once. But with such qualifications as the
English courts have hinted at, we think the rule a safe one."
"1In this case the parties in consenting to enter into the contract
upon Sunday were equally guilty. The law, therefore, will give
neither party any advantage from the contract. But -when one
party has performed the contract on his part and the other seeks,
through his own violation of the statute and desecration of the,
Lord's day to obtain a benefit without compensation, he becomes
the oppressor And the other the oppressed party ; and it is on this
ground that the court affords this relief or redress."
In Logan v. Ofathews, 6 Barr 417, decided by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, it was held-that being an action for
damages to a horse and buggy let on Sunday and used by defendant on that day to go on a ride to his father-that the plaintiff
should recover therefor, and "1that if a bailee for hire return the
property in a damaged state, the burden of proof to show there
was no negligence in its use is upon him."
In ffarrison v. Marsh~all, 4 E. D. Smith 271, New York
Common Pleas, an action for injuries to a horse by negligence
of defendant-the horse being let on Sunday-INGRAHAM, J.,
delivering the opinion of the court, says: "It is objected that the
hiring having been made for Sunday was unlawful, and therefore
the plaintiff could not recover. The action, however, is not for
,the proceeds of the hiring, but for damages for a wrong done, and
for such wrong I suppose the plaintiffs may recover, although they
could not recover the price agreed to be paid for the hiring."
* See, also, Sargent v. Butts, 21 Vt. 99; Banks v. Werts, 13
Ind. 205 ; Boynton v. Page, 13 Wend. 425 ; Story v. Elliott, 8
Cowen 27 , Mohney v. Cook, 26 Penna. (2 Casey) 342; Common
wealth v. NYesbitt, 34 Ibid. (10 Casey) 398; Flagg v. Millbury,
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4 Cush. 243 ; Myers v. State, 1 Conn. 502 ; -Etchberryv. Seville,
2 Hilton N. 0. P. 40; Bloxsome v. Williams, 3 B. & 0. 232 (10
E. C. L. R.) ; Williams v. Paul, 6 Bingh. 653 (19 E. 0. L. R.).
Parsons, in his Treatise on Contracts, p. 262, f, 4th ed., after
stating the case: "1If A. makes a contract with B., prohibited by
the Sunday Law, and therefore void, and B., by means which this
bargain gives him, and by an abuse of the bargain on his part,
commits a wrong against A., is A. barred by his illegal contract
from getting redress for the wrong ?" and citing the Massachusetts and New Hampshire cases above referred to, says: " Upon
the whole we incline to the view held in New Eampshire."
2. As to the Hire.-The person hiring a carriage on Sunday
is the party to be charged with knowledge of the use which he
intends to make of the same.
1st. The use of the horses and carriage is lawful or unlawful,
according to the intent in the mind of the person using them. If
he rides for his health, for charitable or necessary purposes, it is
lawful. If for his pleasure merely, unlawful. If the contrary be
not shown the presumption always is, that a man acts for a lawful
purpose. A livery stable keeper is not bound to presume, when
requested for a horse and carriage on Sunday, that the person
asking therefor wishes it for an unlawful purpose.
2d. And the onus probandiis upon the defendant to show that
the plaintiff did know that he hired the carriage for an unlawful
purpose, if such was the fact, which is not shown in the proof.
3d. If the defendant hired the carriage for pleasure driving, he
was and is guilty of a misdemeanor, and the defendant could not
presume the intent of the defendant to be criminal, unless there
was no other reasonable conclusion.
4th. And particularly in the case of the unconscionable plea of
the defendant, that he should not fulfil his express and *implied
agreements, because the day on which he made them was Sunday,
he should be held strictly to his proof; .an unconscionable plea is not
to be favored by the court, and the party pleading it will not be
assisted by presumptions or conclusions, but must make his case
clear.
3. The plaintiff's claim cannot be defeated unless hle was in
pari delicto with defendant.-The prohibition of the statute is
not against letting horses, but against travelling for other purposes
than those therein specified, while it makes the act of the defend-
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ant criminal, and imposes a penalty upon him for committing it,
imposes none on the plaintiff.
SELDEN, J., delivering the opinion of the Court of Appeals, in
Schermerhorn v. Talman, says that the plaintiff may recover
though particeps criminis when not in par delicto, and that
" the test adopted by Lord MANSFIELD and Mr. Justice BLACKSTONE, by which to determine the relative guilt of the parties,
viz., Ito see upoh which party the penalty is imposed, would seem
to be just." "I am very firmly persuaded that the doctrine
is sound, and the distinction upon which it rests, one which exists
in principle and in reason. It applies no less in equity than at
law, its foundation being that the parties, although joint participators in an illegal transaction, are not equally criminal :" 4
Kern. 94, 123.
"1Mere knowledge by the vendor that -the purchaser intends to
make an illegal use of the property is not a defence to an action
for its price."
In the Court of Appeals, Tracy v. Talmage, President, &c..
the court, per SELDEN, J., held that "It is no defence to an action
brought to recover the price of goods sold that the vendor knew
that they were bought for an illegal purpose, provided it is not
made a part of the contract that they siall be used for that purpose; and provided also that the vendor has done nothing in aid
or furtherance of the unlawful design" beyond the mere sale, with
knowledge of the illegal intent of the purchaser: 4 Kern. 162,
176, 210.
Reaffirmed: Curtis v. Leavitt, 1 Smith (15 N. Y.). See last
paragraph of head notes, p. 182.
The same principle applies of course to property let.
Henry McCloskey, for defendant.-I. The statute prohibits all
travel on Sunday, unless in cases of charity or necessity; or in
going to or returning from some church or place of worship within
the distance of twenty miles; or in going for medical aid or medicines ; or in visiting the sick or carrying the mails; or in going
express by order of some public officer; or in removing a family
or furniture when the removal was commenced on some other day:
1 Revised Statutes 675, § 70, Edmunds 628.
The plaintiff, in letting the horses and vehicle for a pleasure.
drive on Sunday, committed an unlawful act, and hired out his
property knowingly to be used in violating'a law of the state. He
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cannot, therefore, invoke the aid of the law to relieve him from
any injurious consequences 'arising from his own illegal act.
"If from the plaintiff's own showing or otherwise, the cause of
action appears to arise ex turpi causa, or from the transgression
of a positive law of his country, then the courts say he has no
right to be assisted:" .DeGroot v. Van Duyser, 20 Wend. 890.
2. The owner of property who hires it knowingly to be used for
an illegal purpose cannot maintain an action to recover its value,
if destroyed or damaged, for injury done to it.
" If a trader agrees to furnish a robber with arms and ammunition, for the purpose of carrying on his business as a highwayman,
* * * * no action or claim can be sustained in a court of
justice founded on such a contract:" DeGroot v. Van .Duyser,

sup ra.
Furnishing a team to be driven to Coney Island on Sunday, is
as positive a violation of a statute of the state, as it would be to
furnish fire-arms in the instance above cited by the court. If the
arms in the latter case should be injured or destroyed by the
highwayman using them, could the owner who hired them for such
a purpose recover their value ? If not, then the owner of a team
hired for Sunday pleasure-travelling could not recover if the whole
establishment should be destroyed. See also Gregg v. Wyman,
4 Cushing 822.
3. No person can maintain an action founded on an unlawful
proceeding, and it cannot be maintained where the plaintiff in
making out his case is obliged to prove an illegal act as a link in
the chain of evidence.
"The test," says Chitty, " whether a demand connected with
an illegal transaction is capable of being enforced at law, is whether the plaintiff requires any aid from the illegal transaction to
establish his case :" Chitty on Contracts, Hartford edition, 1839,
p. 513.
It was only in consequence of the c6ntract of hiring that the
respondent came to have possession of the horses and carriage,
and that he was under an implied obligation to bestow reasonable
care upon them. Strike out the contract of hiring and the plaintiff cannot establish his case.
"Courts of justice are not required in any way to aid the
enforcement of an illegal contract, or lend their assistance in any
respect to an illegal transaction:" Bose v. Trax, 24 Barb. 361.
"No claim founded on an illegal transaction, whether it be
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malum prohibitum or malum in se, can be enforced by action.
*

*

*

*

*

Every act done against a prohibitory statute

is not only illegal and absolutely void, but the court cannot
assist an illegal transaction in any respect or permit it to
be set up as a protection :" Barton v. The Port Jackson Plank
Road Co., 17 Barb. 397.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
LOTT, J.-The defendant hired of the plaintiff a pair of horses,
wagon, and harness, on Sunday, 23d day of June 1864, for the
purpose of taking a ride to Coney Island, known as a place of
resort for pleasure, and while they were in his possession the
horses ran away in consequence, as it is alleged by the plaintiff,
of the negligence by the defendant in suffering them to stand in
the street without being tied, after being cautioned that it was
unsafe to do so, and the wagon and the harness sustained damage
to a considerable extent. This action is brought to recover the
compensation for the use of the property and the damage done
thereto. The plaintiff was nonsuited on the ground that the con.
tract for the hiring was void.
Travelling on Sundays, except for special purposes and in
specified cases, is prohibited by the statute, and the contract for
the hiring of the property having been made with the knowledge
by the plaintiff that it was to be used for that purpose, was illegal,
and the plaintiff was not entitled to recover any compensation for
the use of the property hired.
The defendant, however, could not, after obtaining possession of
the property, wilfully injure it or suffer it to be injured through
his negligence. Such conduct has no necessary or legitimate
connection with the contract of hiring. The owner does not forfeit
or become divested of his right to the property by its delivery
under it. He has a right to the return of it, and if it is
retained after demand an action could be maintained for the
recovery thereof or its value, and there is no reason or principle
why he should not as well be compensated for its deterioration or
any damage to it by reason of the fault of the party to whom it
was hired. Such liability does not arise from the contract, but
from a breach of duty in violation of the plaintiff's rights wholly
irrespective of the contract. We are therefore of opinion that
the plaintiff was improperly nonsuited, and the judgment in the
court below must be reversed with costs.

JONES & BROWN v. UNITED STATES.

United States Court of Claims.
JONES AND BROWN t,. THE UNITED STATES.
The government, as a contractor, cannot be held responsible for the acts of the
government as a sovereign.
Such acts, whether legislative or executive, affect contracts of the government
only as they affect the contracts of private persons.
An astronomer who assists contracting engineers in their survey and is paid with
their money, but who was not appointed by them and cannot be discharged by them,
and who is not responsible to them, is not their agent.
An Act of Congress does not take away a prerogative of the government except
by special and particular words.
The exclusive statutory right of the government to examine a claimant in this
court, and use or withhold his testimony at its option, is such a prerogative, and is
not taken away by the act declaring that "in courts of the United States there shall
be no exclusion of any witness" "because he is a party to the issue tried." Stat.
L., p. 351, § 3.
Therefore, in this court, a party cannot testify in his own behalf. CAsEY, C.
J., dissenting.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims stated and reviewed.

NoIT,

1866 :-

J., delivered the opinion of the court, February 14th
0

This is an action brought by two civil engineers to recover
$24,026.0.9 damages, growing out of a contract made with them
by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for the survey of the districts described in the treaty between the United States and the
Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians (June 22d 1855) and the treaty
with the Creeks and Seminoles (August 7th 1856). The services
required by the contract, it is conceded, were well performed, and
the price stipulated has been fully paid. Certain "1obstructions
and hindrances on the part of the United States in the performance of their contract," constitute the burden of the claimants'
complaint.
The case involves three questions, which will be separately
considered.
L In the recent case of Deming v. The United States,'this
court decided that a contract between the government and an
individual cannot be affected specially by a general law. That
principle we now reiterate and extend to the case before us.
The "1obstructions and hindrances" complained of on the part of
the United States were the withdrawal of their troops from the
military posts in the Indian country, contrary to the terms of the
VOL.
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Indian treaties; and it is insisted, "as a matter of law," that
"1the United States could not change their attitude or their policy
in a material degree" "without incurring the responsibility of
making the claimants just compensation for all additional expenses
thereby incurred."
This position cannot be sustained. The two characters which
the government possesses as a contractor and as a sovereign
cannot be thus fused; nor can the United States while sued in
the one character be made liable in damages for their acts done
in the other. Whatever acts the government may do, be they
legislative or executive, so long as they be public and general,
cannot be deemed specially to alter, modify, obstruct, or violate
the particular contracts into which it enters with private persons.
The laws of taxes and imposts affect pre-existent executory contracts between individuals, and affect those made with the government, but only to the same extent and in the same way. In this
court the United States appear simply as contractors, and they
are to be held liable only within the same limits that any other
defendant would be in any other court. Though tkeir sovereign
acts, performed for the general good, may work injury to some
private contractors, such parties gain nothing by having the
United States as their defendants. Wherever the public and
private acts of the government seem to commingle, a citizen or
corporate body must by supposition be substituted in its place,
and then the question be determined whether the action will lie
against the supposed lefendant. If the enactment of a law imposing duties will enable the claimant to increase the stipulated
price of the goods he has sold to a citizen, then it will when the
United States are defendants, but not otherwise. If the removal
of the troops from a district liable to invasion will give the claim
ant damages for unforeseen expenses, when the other party is a
corporate body, then it will when the United States form the other
party, but not otherwise. This distinction between the public acts
and private contracts of the government-not always strictly
insisted on in the earlier days of this court-frequently misapprehended in public bodies, and constantly lost sight of by suitors
who come before us, we now desire to make so broad and distinct
that hereafter the two cannot be confounded; and we repeat, as a
principle applicable to all cases, that the United States, as a con-
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tractor, cannot be held liable, directly or indirectly, for the public
acts of the United States as a sovereign
II. The contract contains the following provision.
,It is further understood and agreed * ** that an astronomer
shall be appointed by the commissioner, and his salary, at the rate
of $2500 per annum, to be paid by the said commissioner out of
whatever moneys may be due to the said Jones and Brown for the
services herein agreed upon, upon conditions herein expressed,
but all other expenses incidental to the performance of the duties
required of him, the said astronomer in the field, to be paid by the
said Jones and Brown; and the said astronomer shall be responsible to the United States fo' the determination of such astronomical points as may be necessary to fulfil the conditions of this
agreement. Said astronomer shall be allowed ample time and
facilities for fixing said astronomical points, viz., the 100th and
98th meridians, to his entire satisfaction, provided that not more
than six months be exceeded."
The claimants were at the same time instructed (which instructions were made a part of the contract) as follows:
" Every line run by you must be upon the true meridian. You
will proceed to run the 98th and 100th degrees of west longitude
from any practical points established by the astronomer as the
true meridian. The 98th and 100th degrees of west longitude
being important geographical lines requiring careful astronomical
observations for their correct determination, you will therefore
exert your best ability to discharge this duty to the satisfaction
of the government and to your own credit, giving every facility to
the astronomer to fix these points upon the ground in accordance
with treaty stipulations. The astronomer will therefore be ordered
to report to you whenever you signify your readiness to execute
the above bounden duty."
Under these provisions of the contract it was insisted on the
trial that the delay was in part due to the non-establishment of the
initial points by the astronomer, and that "he was to do this work
as the independent agent of the United States."
This part of the case is an after-thought. There is not one
word in the petition charging the government with this responsibility; and, indeed, the petition expressly negatives the idea, for
it speaks of the delay of the astronomer as " b eyond his control
by Indian depredations." If the evidence relating to this ground
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had been objected to at the proper time, we should have excluded
it for the variance. But inasmuch as it was admitted without
objection, and when it was not too late for the claimants to have
amended their petition, we feel bound to look into it and see to
what extent it might have affected the case.
And first is to be determined the question whether the astronomer was the agent of the claimants or of the defendants. He
was to be paid by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, but out of
moneys going to the claimants under the contract-in other words,
with their money. He was also to do a part of their work, and
his expenses, " incidental to the performance of the duties required
of him in the field," were to be paid -by them. But, at the same
time, the claimants did not appoint him, and could not discharge
him; they could not exercise over him any control; and for the
accuracy of his work he was to be " held responsible to the United
States." Therefore he was no agent of the claimants.
But it does not follow that the delay was the astronomer's act,
or the fault or misfortune of the government. On the contrary,
the contract required the claimants to furnish him with "1ample
facilities for fixing the astronomical points," which, we think,
must be held to include the necessary transportation and a suffi.
cient escort. In fact, the astronomer did not fix the initial points
for the reason that the claimants could not convey him to the
proper localities. This was their misfortune, and raises no legal
liability on the part of the United States.
There may be, however, two exceptional instances to this.
The testimony in this case is made up chiefly of the opinions
and conclhsions of the witnesses. As is usually the case with
such evidence, it is deficient in the material facts by which the
court must form opinions and draw conclusions. It, however,
indicates that in April 1858 the astronomer was sent forward with
a small party to fix the initial point of the 98th meridian, while
the main body was running the Choctaw and Chickasaw line.
Instead of thus proceeding the astronomer halted at Fort Arbuckle, and there waited until the main body came up. The
"1dates of survey" show that the running of the Choctaw line was
completed on the 12th April, and that the running of the 98th
meridian was begun on the 22d June ; but how long the party was
in going from the Choctaw ground to the vicinity of the initial
point, and at what time the astronomer began and ended his
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observations, and how long, in short, the claimants were delayed
by the astronomer between the 12th April and 22d June, does not
appear.
It is also indicated by the evidence that some delay may have
been caused by the government in fixing the initial point of the
100th meridian, for which the claimants should be reimbursed.
The astronomer requests authority "to continue astronomical
observations an additional -lunation," and the commissioner instructs him, "that if in your opinion deemed essentially necessary
to the proper performance of the work designated, said request
will be granted;" to which the astronomer replies, "I shall infer
from your letter that the wishes of the department are to expend
another month if very necessary;" but the only evidence to show
that this permission was acted upon, the court, for reasons presently to be stated, cannot consider.
III. In the third place, this case brings up the important question whether in this court a claimant may be a witness in his own
behalf. There has been no case in which the point has been
raised and determined. But here the principal, and in some
matters the only witness, is Alfred H. Jones, one of the claimants.
No specific objection to him as a witness appears on the record,
aud no question as to the admissibility of his testimony was presented on the trial; yet, inasmuch as a part of his case rests
exclusively upon his own testimony, the court of necessity must
notice the fact and decide whether it can be received as competent
evidence.
There appear to be involved in the question whether a party
may testify as his own witness in his own action against the
government, two principles. The first of these is that of mutuality
whereby in an ordinary action the law secures a reciprocal benefit
to either party. Under the 14 & 15 Viet. c. 99 (August 7th 1851),
which is the parent act of the legislation that of late years has
overturned one of the cardinal maxims of the common law, such
testimony is received where the opposing party is an executor or
administrator, and no subsequent statute has amended the act in
this particular (16 & 17 Vict. c. 83). But the most of our state
legislatures have restricted similar laws to cases where the evidence of the party could not be offered against one who represented
another, and who, from the nature of things, must reap a lesser
benefit. In the Act of Congress under which parties may now

JONES & BROWN v. INITED STATES.

offer themselves as -witnesses (St. L. 351, § 3), no such restriction
was imposed, but by a subsequent enactment Congress has estab.
lished it (Act March d 1865, 13 St. L. 533).
But where the United States are a party no mutuality of benefit
can exist. The government is not, like an individnal, cognisant
of its own transactions. Those transactions are numberless, dependent on unnumbered officers, and scattered not only through
every portion of its wide territory, but through every quarter of
the world. The government cannot become a witness for itself;
one party would gain, therefore, a convenience, while the other,
from the nature of things, could gain nothing. The government
must depend upon its agents, and they alone can defend it by
their testimony. They are equally within the call of the claimant
and equally competent to be witnesses for him. It would not be
unreasonable to require that he should produce those with whom
he dealt; but this the law does not impose; it only leaves him
free to resort to them. If they be absent, he will be the party
best able to find them. If they be deadi it will be his misfortune,
and the United States will be equally without witnesses to estab
lish their defence.
It may be answered that the government is like a corporation,
which acts by its officers, and which has been held to be a living
person within the meaning of kindred statutes, and against which
parties are allowed to testify. But there is no justness in likening a little assemblage of men, associated voluntarily for their
private gain, and having their individuality covered by a legal
fiction, to the great body politic of the nation, where all have
equal rights and equal interests, and where the officer of the
government is as much the agent of the party calling him as of
the President, and where the claimant possesses as great an
interest in his testimony as does any other citizen in the realm.
Therefore we must hold that, if this act extends to the claimant,
and makes his testimony competent, which at the common law is
incompetent, it was the intent of Congress -to confer upon one
party to the action an exclusive benefit, and that the statute must
be so construed. It is needless to say that we hesitate to place
upon the statute such a construction, and can do so only when,
from all of its provisions and purposes, we are satisfied that such
was the legislative intent.
The second and more important principle involved in this branch
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of the case is the principle, generally known but rarely invoked,
that "the king is not bound by any act of parliament, unless he
be named therein by special and particular words." (1 Blks.
261.) The rule and the exceptions to it were laid down in Coke's
time (5 Rep. 14; "7Id. 82; 11 Id. 74), and they have not been
changed or departed from to this day. It is the exceptions that
we have now to consider, and they are enumerated in the books
as " acts for the advancement of religion, providing for the poor,
and the prevention of wrong ;" and to these may be added a
fourth exception, embracing, as Woodeson says (1 Woodeson 81),
"such inferior claims as might belong indifferently to the king or
to a subject, as the title to an advowson or a landed estate." I
have been able to discover no case in either the American or
English courts which does not fall within one of these four classes ;
yet, as this question is one of unusual importance, and one upon
whicl the court is divided, it will be proper to examine these cases
more particularly.
And first, there is a class of cases dependent upon the maxims
of the common law, that time runs not against the king, and that
laches cannot be imputed to the crown, which are numerous and
universally acknowledged and known; for no'one at this day will
pretend that the government is barred by a Statute of Limitations,
be the language thereof ever so comprehensive and positive.
These cases indeed come under the rule; yet inasmuch as they
depend on a particular and very cogent reason of their own, I
attach to them but little weight so far as the case now under consideration is concerned. Of such, perhaps, the strongest in this
country is The United States v. Hloar, 2 Mason 814, where Mr.
Justice STORY lays down the rule as broadly as in any of the English decisions; and the case of Josselyn v. Stone, 28 Miss. R. 753,
where the Supreme Court says, "1The general words of a statute
do not include the state, or affect her rights, unless she be specially named, or it be clear and indisputable from the act that it
was intended to include the state." To these may be added the
case of The Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 1 Watts 54, where Chief
Justice GIBSON, with great and characteristic power, reviews the
American cases, and establishes the conclusion that "this prerogative is a principle of our government, and a part of the law of
the land."
Of the English cases, which have been chiefly noted and relied
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on as establishing exceptions to the rule, I may instance, first,
The Case of EcclesiasticalPersons, 5 R. 14 b. By the Act of
13 Eliz. cap. 10, ecclesiastical persons were restrained " to make
any lease," and where one was made to the queen it was held to
be void. But this was a statute to prevent the decay of religion,
and therefore one of the established exceptions. Yet even here
the judges are careful to point out the admitted exceptions, and
to explain the reason, viz., " for religion, justice, and truth are
the sure supporters of the crown, and the diadems of kings."
In the great and leading case of Magdalen College, 11 R. 73,
all the learning of Coke is displayed, and the rule and its exceptions closely reviewed. But here, in addition to the reason in the
Case of Ecclesiastical-Persons,there appeared this very sufficient
reason, viz.: "The intent of the masters and fellows was that
they would convey the said house to Benedict Spinola and his
heirs; and because they could not do it de directo, they attempted
to do it ex obliquo, to grant it to the queen and her successors,
but upon condition that the queen within three months should
grant the said house to the said Benedict Spinola." "1So that it
was endeavored that the queen, who was the fountain of justice,
should thereby be made the instrument of injury and wrong."
In Beaumont's Case, 2 Inst. 681, the question arose out of the
Statute of Discontinuances (32 Henry VIII. cap. 28), which act
provided that no fine suffered by the husband only shall make a
discontinuance prejudicial to the wife. Of this statute the court
says: "Albeit the king is not named in the act, yet is he bound
by the act, because it is made to suppress a wrong." To which
is added, "1every discontinuance worketh a wrong, and the king,
being God's lieutenant, cannot do a wrong."
The case of Willion v. Berkley, Plowden 226 a, arose from the
statute de donis conditionalibus. Before the statute, a gift to a
man and the heirs of his body, remainder to the donor, would not
revert; and it was held that there was no remainder, and that the
grantee took a fee. The grant being to the king here, the question was, whether he became bound by the act. On this question
the court stood divided. Justice WESTO.N held that the king was
not bound by the act; but Justice ANTHONY BRowN held other-

wise: "For the person of the king is not to be respected in gifts
of land, but the quality of the estate is to be considered; and the
person of the king shall not rule the estate in the land, but the
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estate in the land shall rule the person of the king." And he
also said: "Then as to the statute, it was intended to repress a
mischief and a grievance."
DYER, Chief Justice, went still further: "And as to what is
said, that the king shall not be bound by the act, and that there
shall not be any restraint in the estate which he takes, unless the
same be precisely expressed in the act, sir, I admit that in some
cases the king shall not be restrained by general words without
express restraint in the act, and that is according to the matter
of the act; but in this act he shall be bound, for it is made for
the furtherance of restitution ; that is to say, where it was a great
abuse that the donee had the power of aliening after issue had
(which, being a common error, was taken for the common law),
this statute was made to reform the abuse, and to restore the common law in this point to its right and just course, which.it did, by
restoring to the donor the observance of his intent."
So it appears that there are three reasons why the decision is
no authority in this case: First, because it related to property of
the king as a natural person; second, because the act did not
affect or restrain any pre-existent prerogative of the crown; and,
third, because the judges assigned reasons which show that they
believed the act to be for the suppression of wrong and the restoring of the common law.
In The King v. Archbislwp of Armagh, Str. 516, which was
a case where the archbishop had "consolidated the rectory and
vicarage," under the Act of 10 Car. I., judgment was for the
king, though upon other grounds. But Justice EYRE said: "I
think this statute will extend to the crown, because it does not
deprive the crown of any prior right, but only new models it."
The case is therefore no authority, being for the king; and the
dictum shows that in no case would it have been authority, for
the statute took away no prior right.
Rex v. TMrigltt, 1 Ad. & El. 434, was the case of an appeal,
under 11 George IV. and 1 William IV. cap. 70, where it was
objected that the act did not bind the crown, and that a writ of
error would not lie to the Exchequer Chamber in a case where
the crown was a real party. It was held that the appeal did lie.
]3ht per Chief Justice TINDAL: "The act itself is entitled ' An
act for the more effectual administration of justice,' and the preamble of the act declares its intention to be ' to make mere
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effectual provision for the administration of justice in England
and Wales.' And again, the eighth section, by which this court
is constituted, is expressed in terms the most general and ample:
'That writs of error upon any judgment given by any of the said
courts shall hereafter be made returnable only before the judges
or judges and barons, as the case may be, of the other two courts
in the Exchequer Chamber.' In the case, therefore, of an act of
parliament passed expressly for the further advancement of justice, and in its particular enactment using terms so comprehensive
as to include all cases brought up by writ of error, we think there
is neither authority nor principle for implying the exception of
criminal cases upon the ground that the king, as public prosecutor, is not expressly mentioned in the act."
In the case of De Bode v. Regina, 14 Jur. 970, which was
founded on a petition of right, the court.of highest legal authority
in England, the Exchequer Chamber, reviewedithe case of Rex v.
TFriglht, and again held that an appeal would lie though the crown
were a party. Yet here Lord Chief Justice WILDE expressly says:
"If any special prerogative of the Crown was thereby taken
away, as, for instance, if there had been a special tribunal for the
decision of writs of error brought by the Crown, or where the
Crown was a party; or [if] the Crown had an option, which the
subject had not, to have a writ of error, against the judgment, in
its favor in any court that it should elect, doubtless such a prerogative would not be taken away."
I shall endeavor presently to show that the case at bar complies
with these conditions; that the United States have a special tribu- na for the decision of actions brought against them; that within
that tribunal they have a statutory right to use or withhold the
testimony of an opposing party; and that this right is a special
prerogative which cannot by general words or ordinary implication
be taken away.
Of the cases wherein it has been decided that the governm6nt
is not bound by the general words of statute, the first which I
shall notice is that of the Attorney-General v. -LancelotAllgood,
Parker, p. 1. In it great learning is displayed and all the preceding cases are reviewed, and, moreover, it is cited and approved
in the case in the Exchequer Chamber, which has been quoted
(De Bode v. Regina). The action was an " information of intru.
sion." On behalf of the defendant, the court was moved for
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leave to plead three several matters as allowed by the statute of 4
Anne, c. 16. It was insisted that the king, not being expressly
named, was not bound by the act; and on that point the Lord
Chief Baron used language which I think not inapplicable to the
case before us:" But it is further observable that two of the reasons upor.
which the cases .cited by the defendant's counsel are founded, viz.,
the advancement of religion and the suppression of fraud, totally
fail in the present case, and the remaining consideration is, whether the restraining of a defendant from pleading several matters
in his defence was a wrong of such a nature as these cases allude
to. And it seems to me pretty extraordinary to charge a rule of
the common law (which prevailed for centuries, as appears by Co.
Litt. 903 a) with such an imputation; and it will afford no argument that this was a wrong, within the meaning of these cases, to
say that the public wisdom of the nation has mide an alteration."
There are numerous cases to the same effect, of which a few may
be taken for analogy. It appears by The King v. Allen, 15
East 333 that the statute of 48 Geo. 3, cap. 74, which provides
that with respect to the duties on malt, the decision of the sessions
shall be final "between the parties," and that no certiorari shall
be allowed, " does not preclude the Crown from removing the conviction and the order of the sessions quashing the same by certiorari." And it appears by the Attorney-General v. Nhewman, 1
Price 438, that a provision in the Malt Act limiting the Crown to
five years within which to commence suits for duties, is not continued by subsequent acts on the same subject even though they
refer to it, and that " it is a clear rule that the right of the Crown
is not to be taken away by doubtful words or ambiguous expressions." And it appears by the King v. Cook, 3 Term R. 522,
that although by the statute 25 Geo. 3, the postmaster was
required to take "from the person or persons hiring" post-horses
a stamped receipt, and had neglected to do so of a government
courier, yet-per Lord KENYON-" Now although there was no
special exemption of the king in this Act of Parliament, yet I am
of opinion that he is exempted by virtue of his prerogative."
But a stronger and more modern case is that of oztountjoy v
Vood, in the Court of Exchequer (1 Hurlst. & Norm. 58), where
it was "moved on the part of the Crown to remove into the court
a cause" wherein the defendant sought to recover one pound.
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The application was founded on the prerogative of the Crown to
remove into the Court of Exchequer any cause commenced in any
other court touching the Crown revenue."
Pigott, Serjt., showed cause, that "The jurisdiction of the
court is taken away by 9 & 10 Viet. c. 95, s. 90, which enacts,
'That no plaint entered in any court holden under that act shall
be removed or removable from the said court into any of her
Majesty's superior courts of record, by any writ or process, unless
the debt or damage claimed shall exceed X5.' "
Per Curiam, "1The Crown always had a prerogative to remove
into this court causes affecting the revenue, and that right is not
taken away by the enactment referred to."
Of American decisions, which are not founded upon the maxims
respecting time and laches, I have found but one, which is that of
the People v. Bossiter, 4 Cowen 144; and it, apparently, received
but little attention from the very learned and able court that considered it. The defendant was imprisoned upon ca. sa. after he
had executed an assignment in bankruptcy, under an act which
declared that upon executing such an assignment a party should
be exempt from imprisonment "1by reason of any debt or debts."
The court refused to discharge the defendant, and said, "1The
king is not bound by a bankrupt law unless named."
There is, however, an English case bearing closely upon the
question, and even growing out of the English statute to amend
the law of evidence, 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99. This case is that of
the Attorney-Ceneral v. Radcliff, Hurl. & Gord., 10 Exch.
p. 84, and the facts are these :An information for. the Crown was filed by the attcrrney-general
against the defendant to recover penalties for violations of the
revenue laws. The defendant offered himself as a witness at the
trial, and was rejected as incompetent. On a rule nisi for a new
trial the court was equally divided. Two of the judges regarded
the information as a civil, while the other two'regarded it as a
criminal proceeding; but all were agreed that if the defendant
were not excepted by the third section of the act, which excepted
criminal proceedings, he would be a competent witness. The
question now considered was not discussed by the court, nor,
apparently, much relied upon by counsel. But the point was
raised by the attorney-general, who said, "As an additional argument the Crown is not named in the act, and, consequently, is not
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bound by it." To which POLLOCK, Chief Baron, answered, on the
argument: "Th6 Crown is not bound with reference to matters
affecting its property or person, but is bound with respect to the
practice in the administration of justice."
As has been said, the point was not further considered by the
court, and the dictum of the Chief Baron is much too broadly
stated to be of great authority, yet the learning and experience
of the court, particularly in matters relating to the prerogatives
of the crown, render this a very strong case against the government, which I probably should be willing to adopt as the decision
of this court, but for the particular reasons now to be stated.
The Act of Congress which establishes this new law of evidence
does not possess the formality and care usually awarded to so
important a statute, being simply a proviso in the civil appropriation Act of 1864, and in. these words:".rovided, That in the courts of the United States there shall
be no exclusion of any witness on account of color, nor, in civil
actions, because he is a party to, or interested in, the issue tried."
13 Stat. L., p. 351, s. 3.
Within one year after its passage the attention of Congress was
drawn to the fact that they had legislated more largely than had
been intended, and the proviso was reduced by an enactment, providing that, "in an action by or against executors, administrators,
or guardians," "neither party shall be allowed to testify against
the other as to any transaction with, or statement by, the testator,
intestate, or ward." Act March 3d 1865, 13 Stat. at Large 533.
The congresional records show that the first part of the proviso,
respecting color, was offered by Senator Sumner, as an amendment to the bill before the Senate; that Senator Buckalew thereupon moved to add the second part, relating to parties, and that
the proviso, thus amended, was adopted by the Senate: Cong.
Globe, Part IY., p. 3259. And this leads us to inquire what were
the facts and circumstances which suggested and called for this
piece of legislation.
The Judiciary Act provides, that "the laws of the severa.
states" "shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common
law in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply:"
1 Stat. at Large 81. And the Act of July 6th 1862 (12 Stat. at
Large, p. 588), provides, that "The laws of the state in which the
court shall be held shall be the rules of decision as to the compe
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tency of witnesses in the courts of the United States, in trials at
common law, in equity, and admiralty."
By the phrase "courts of the United States" was meant the
courts helds in the different states, and it has never been supposed
that these acts shall be extended to this court, although this is one
of the "courts of the United States." Under this rule, a most
diverse practice had grown up in the " courts of the United
States," dependent upon and caused by the local law of the
respective states in which they were held. In some circuits witnesses were excluded on account of color, in others on account of
interest, and in others because they were parties; while, on the
contrary, in certain other circuits all of these reasons combined
were not a sufficient cause to exclude them. Congress, thereforie,
passed the act declaring that " in the courts of the United States
there shall be no exclusion of any witness on account of color, nor
in civil actions because he is a party to, or interested in, the issue
tried." But, for the foregoing reasons, I incline to believe that
by "courts of the United States," Congress meant those courts
of the United States to which the Judiciary Act extends; and by
"civil actions," those civil actions between citizens which had
become subject to different and inconsistent rules of decision.
But above and beyond these reasons is one on which I am disposed chiefly to rest this decision. One year before the statute
amending the law of evidence, Congress passed the act reorganizing and reconstructing this court: 12 Stat. L. 765. Prior to it,
the court had consisted of three judges, whose decisions took the
form of reports to Congress, which awaried thereon to the suitors
their only remedy; by it the court is raised to five judges; its
jurisdiction is extended from claims "founded upon any law of
Congress, or upon any regulation of an executive department, or
upon any contract expressed or implied": 10 Stat. L. 612 ; to "all
set-offs, counter claims, claims for damages, whether liquidated or
unliquidated, or other demands whatsoever, on the part of the
government" : 12 Stat. I. 765 ; and it is empowered to render judgments for, a"against, the United States. From certain of these
judgments an appeal is given to the Supreme Court of the United
States, but otherwise they are made final and conclusive; and
those rendered against the government are to be paid directly by
the Secretary of the Treasury without the interposition of Congress, and without any further or special appropriation being made
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therefor. Finally, this court, thus constituted, with such prompt
and ample means of redress, exceeding those appertaining to "the
petition of right" at the common law (8 Blks. 255; Viscount
Canterburyv. Regina, 7 Jurist 224), is open to every citizen who,
by the mere filing of his petition, can become a suitor, and, as a.
matter of right, have his controversy with his government adjudged
by the fixed and impartial principles of justice which determine
the rights of individuals in courts of law. Nevertheless, it was
further enacted at the same time, and made an implied condition
to the trial of the suit (sec. 8), that it should be lawful for the
United States, through their solicitor, to require any claimant to
appear "1and be examined on oath or affirmation touching any or
all matters pertaining to his claim." And this right is not made
reciprocal and given to the claimant by the act; for not only does
the silence of the statute retain the rule of the common law, but
it also expressly restricts the claimant from the benefits of his evidence so taken; for it expressly provides that the evidence shall
be taken at the instance of the government, and that when so taken
and filed, it may " be read and used as evidence on the trial,"
only "1at the discretion of the solicitor of the United States." A
privilege thus primarily connected with the remedy of the claimant, thus positively engrafted upon the very organism of this court,
becomes therein, in my judgment, a statutory prerogative of the
government, which cannot be repealed by the implication of subsequent statutes, and which can only be taken away by " special and
particular words."
I think it, therefore, established, that by the act reorganizing this
court, the government was invested with an exclusive right to take
the testimony of claimants, an exclusive right to use it, an exclusive
right to withhold it; and that if the statute changing the law of
evidence be construed to embrace the government within its pur
view, this exclusive right will be taken away. If it be said that
this statute is in accordance with the enlightened policy of modern
legislation, I can only answer that Congress could hardly have so
changed their policy in a single year. If it be said that the statute is
remedial in its nature and for the advancement of justice, I must
reply that such acts only include the government when the government will be equally benefited thereby; that, as in the case put
by Chief Justice WnIDE, in DeBode v. Regina, here is a "special
tribunal" for the decision of actions against the government; here
the government has an " option which the subject has not ;" here
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the government may "elect" to use or to withhold the testimany
which it may alone may call forth; and these constitute a prerogative, which it was not intended the act should take away. If it
be said that the statute is an act for the suppression of wrong, and
that the restraining of a claimant from using his own testimony to
.advance his own case is a wrong, I may best refute it by replying
with Chief Baron PARKER, in the Attorney- General v. Allgood,
that this "is not a wrong of such a nature as these cases allude to.
And it seems to me pretty extraordinary to charge a rule of the
common law (which prevailed for centuries) with such an imputa.
tion; and it will afford no argument that this was a wrong, within
the meaning of these cases, to say that the public wisdom of the
nation has made an alteration."
It has been suggested that if parties cannot testify, persons of
color cannot, as both are rendered eligible by the same act.
There was never a law of Congress which excluded witnesses on
account of color ; and this court has always recognised the rules of
the common law, which make no such distinctions. It is not so
with parties. They have been ever excluded, and are still, except
where made competent by statute. The reasons which conclude
them from testifying against the government do not apply to the
testimony of a disinterested though colored witness. If this
statute never had been passed, this court would not exclude a witness on account of color; nor does it admit him now by virtue of
the statute. The court knows no rule by which it can exclude
him; nor does it look to the law of Maryland as the rule of its
decision. And if the act were necessary to make such a witness
competent, it might still so operate; for though one of its provisions affects a prerogative of the government, the other does not,
and the latter is not dependent on the former.
There still remains one statute supposed to affect this question.
On the same day that Congress passed the proviso in the Civil
Service Act, a statute, carefully drawn, and closely patterned after
the 14 & 15 Vict., was enacted, which is entitled, "An act relating to the law of evidence in the District of Columbia," 13 Stat.
L. 374. By this it is declared, that "on the trial of any issue
* * in any suit, action, or other proceeding in any court of
justice in the District of Columbia, * * * the parties thereto
* * *
shall be competent and compellable to give evidence."
The courts in the District of Columbia were established as early
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as 1801, by "An act concerning the District of Columbia," 2
Stat. L. 103. It provided that the District should be "formed
into two counties ;" that there should be "a court in said District,
which should be called the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia; that there should be appointed in and for each of said counties," justices of the peace, and "a judge, to be called the judge
of the Orphans' Court." There was also "_An act to establish
criminal court in the District of Columbia," passed July 7th 1838,
_
5 Stat. L. 306 ; and, finally, in 1863, " An
act to reorganize the
courts in the District of Columbia, and for other purposes," 12
Stat. L. 762.
The Court of Claims is not a court "in the District of Columbia." Its sessions chance to be held at the city of Washington,
but its jurisdiction extends throughout the United States. It
issues writs to every part of the country, and is specially authorized to enforce them: 10 Statutes at Large 612, § 3. There is
.no reason ivhy it should not sit beyond the limits of the district,
and if occasion required, it would not hesitate to do so. It has
never followed the practice of the courts of Maryland, nor been
affected nor limited by her local laws. Other courts are courts
of the United States for particular states or districts ; the Court
of Claims is a court of the United States for the United States,
and for no particular state or district. Its jurisdiction is as great
and as limited elsewhere as here, and here as elsewhere. By
"courts in the District of Columbia," Congress must mean those
courts which have been known hitherto by that designation, or
else courts whose jurisdiction is "in the District of Columbia."
The Court of Claims is neither one of the courts thus designated
nor a court whose jurisdiction is restricted to the district. The
act referred to, therefore, does not extend to it.'
I The remaining statutes affecting the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims are
the Captured Property Act of March 3d 1863, (12 Stat. L., 820,) whereby the jurisdiction of the court is extended to claims for the proceeds of abandoned or captared property; and the Act of July 4th 1864, (13 Stat. L., 381,) whereby it is
restrained from exercising jurisdiction of claims for the destruction or appropriation
of property by the army or navy engaged in the suppression of the rebellion. See
also the case of Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wallace R. 403, and Gordon v. The
United States, Id. 561.
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